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Abstract
 
Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have liberalized markets to improve efficiency and enhance market linkages for
smallholder farmers. The expected positive response by the private sector in areas with limited market infrastructure has
however been very limited. The functioning of markets is constrained by high transaction costs and coordination problems
along the production-to-consumption value chain. New kinds of institutional arrangements are needed to reduce these costs
and fill the vacuum left when governments withdrew from markets in the era of structural adjustments. One of these
institutional innovations has been the strengthening of producer organizations and formation of collective marketing groups
as instruments to remedy pervasive market failures in rural economies. The analysis presented here with a case study from
eastern Kenya has shown that marketing groups pay 20–25% higher prices than other buyers to farmers while participation
was also positively correlated with adoption of improved dryland legume varieties, crops not targeted by the formal
extension system. However the effectiveness of marketing groups is undermined by external shocks and structural
constraints that limit the volume of trade and access to capital and information, and require investments in complementary
institutions and coordination mechanisms to exploit scale economies. Successful groups have shown high levels of collective
action in the form of increased participatory decision making, member contributions and initial start-up capital. Failure to
pay on delivery, resulting from lack of capital credit, is a major constraint that stifles competitiveness of marketing groups
relative to other buyers. These findings call for interventions that improve governance and participation; mechanisms for
improving access to operating capital; and effective strategies for risk management and enhancing the business skills of
farmer marketing groups.
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1. Introduction
 
Many sub-Saharan countries have liberalized their
economies and developed poverty reduction strategies
aimed at opening up new market-led opportunities for
economic growth. The results have, however, been mixed
(Winter-Nelson and Temu, 2002; Dorward and Kydd, 2004;
Fafchamps, 2004). A large number of smallholder farmers
continue to engage in subsistence agriculture and are
therefore unable to benefit from liberalized markets.
Structural problems of poor infrastructure (Kydd and
Dorward, 2004; Dorward 
 
et al.
 
, 2005) and lack of market
institutions (World Bank, 2002) continue to characterize
the subsector with high transaction costs, coordination
failure and pervasive market imperfections. Moreover,
partial implementation of reforms and policy reversals have
tended to mute the positive effects of liberalization (Jayne
 
et al.
 
, 2002). Although opportunities afforded by liberal-
ization have not been fully exploited, the expectation that
removing state marketing boards would open opportunities
for the private sector to take over these functions has not
been fully realized in many areas. However, avenues exist
in market institutions that make use of collective action
to complement government and private sector responses
for enhanced coordination in rural commodity markets.
This is because individual marketing of produce may not
make economic sense due to small quantities, large spatial
distances from input and output markets and subsequently
the associated high transportation costs, all characteristics
of small-scale production especially in the semi-arid areas.
Underdeveloped market infrastructure in these areas makes
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them less-favoured for private investment and agro-enterprise
development even when the agricultural potential is high.
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This paper aims to analyze the role that institutional and
organizational innovations can play in improving the
performance of rural markets in semi-arid areas lacking in
terms of development infrastructure. With a case study of
Producer Marketing Groups (PMGs) in semi-arid Eastern
Kenya, the paper identifies potentials and limitations of
rural institutions in providing market services for small-
scale producers of staple and marketable crops. The effect
of marketing groups on producer prices and the uptake of
improved technologies are investigated along with
institutional and organizational factors that condition the
performance of marketing groups. The study finds that
farmer groups have the potential to improve market
opportunities and access to new technologies for small
producers in less-favoured areas. If properly organized and
governed, PMGs can overcome elite capture and corruption
and help facilitate commercialization of smallholder
production. The key policy issues are related to capital
constraints and lack of supportive policies for the growth
and development of farmer marketing groups.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews market institutions and their emerging roles in
remedying market imperfections in rural areas. Section 3
outlines the data and methods used in the case study.
Section 4 presents the main results, followed by a summary
of the key findings and policy implications in the
concluding section. 
 
2. Role of institutions in imperfect markets
 
2.1. Can institutions help overcome market failures?
 
According to North (1990), institutions constitute formal
constraints (i.e., rules, laws, constitutions), informal
constraints (i.e., norms of behaviour, conventions, and
self-imposed codes of conduct) that structure human
interactions, and their enforcement characteristics. Along
the same line, World Bank (2002) defines institutions as
rules, enforcement mechanisms and organizations that
promote market transactions. These definitions show that
institutions provide multiple functions to markets; they
transmit information, mediate transactions, facilitate the
transfer and enforcement of property rights and contracts,
and manage the degree of competition. They can therefore
be used to help remedy market failures in rural markets.
Market failures are due to asymmetric information, high
transaction costs and imperfectly specified property rights.
They tend to be more pronounced in rural areas with under-
developed road and communication networks and other
market infrastructure, typical of many semi-arid regions
in sub-Saharan Africa. Without supporting market
institutions, rural markets in these areas tend to be thin and
imperfect, leading to high marketing and transaction costs.
These costs undermine the exchange process (Kranton,
1996; Gabre-Madhin, 2001) leading to atomized rural
markets with few rural–urban linkages (Chowdhury 
 
et al.
 
,
2005). Given such market arrangements, households
respond by producing a limited range of goods and services
for own consumption especially when household food
security is not assured (de Janvry 
 
et al.
 
, 1991). Further,
important market players fail to undertake profitable
investments (due to the absence of complementary
investments) leading to coordination failures that hinder
market performance (Dorward 
 
et al.
 
, 2005; Poulton 
 
et al.
 
,
2006). Associated shocks and vulnerabilities to production
risk (i.e., weather, pests and sickness) and market risk also
exacerbate market imperfections and transaction failures
(Dorward and Kydd, 2004). Institutional innovations that
reduce transaction costs and enhance market coordination
— such as marketing groups that make use of collective
action — can be instrumental in overcoming some of these
problems.
 
2.2. Farmer organizations for improving markets
 
Farmer organizations have the potential to mitigate the
effects of imperfect markets by enabling contractual links
to input and output markets (Coulter 
 
et al.
 
, 1999) and by
promoting economic coordination in liberalized markets
(Rondot and Collion, 1999) upon which market functions
for smallholder farmers can be leveraged. Realization of
this potential will however depend on their ability to
convey market information; coordinate production and
marketing functions; define and enforce property rights and
contracts; and more critically mobilize smallholder farmers
to participate in markets and enhance competitiveness of
agro-enterprises.
Efforts aimed at promoting PMGs backed by innovative
mechanisms for supporting market functions will need
to consider development of a new generation of farmer
cooperatives as business-oriented enterprises. The legacy
of farmer cooperatives in Africa has not been exemplary in
providing business opportunities and marketing services
to small producers (Hussi 
 
et al.
 
, 1993; Akwabi-Ameyaw,
1997). The lessons indicate that farmer organizations can
succeed if farmers are allowed to manage them auto-
nomously with minimal government interference, participate
actively in decision-making, and if collective action
reduces transaction costs and improves competitiveness.
This implies that a new set of policies and institutional
reforms would be desirable to facilitate their transformation
as private sector enterprises with clear business plans,
instead of their past role as non-profitable public sector
 
1
 
Following Pender and Hazell (2000), we define less-favoured
environments as areas with relatively low agricultural potential often
overlooked or neglected in terms of infrastructural investments in the past
as well as areas of good agricultural potential but that have limited access
to infrastructure and markets.
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service providers. Such institutional arrangements seem to
raise hopes for rural areas affected by pervasive market
imperfections to benefit from market integration and
commercialization of production. Yet collective action is a
critical factor in realizing this potential. Participation in
collective action will depend on the magnitude of expected
benefits and associated costs. Collective action is likely to
occur if the gains in terms of reduced transaction costs,
better input and/or product prices, empowerment and
capacity enhancement outweigh the associated costs of
complying with collective rules and norms. Effective
collective action would also depend on good leadership,
good governance and participatory decision making
(Mude, 2006).
 
3. Case study and analytical methods
 
The study uses two sets of data that were obtained in 2003
and a follow-up survey in 2005. The data were collected
by the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-
Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) in Mbeere and Makueni districts
of the semi-arid Eastern Province of Kenya, where market
infrastructure is very limited and recurrent droughts reduce
agricultural productivity and pose threats to rural
livelihoods. These districts were targeted as potential areas
where dryland legumes like pigeonpea and chickpea could
be exploited to reduce poverty and vulnerability. The two
districts are located in part of the larger semi-arid lands
characterized by low density paved roads and limited
access to major marketing centres. Farmers produce limited
marketable surplus. Despite climatic variability and
recurrent droughts, smallholder agriculture is almost
entirely dependent on rains.
A random sample of 400 households (240 in Mbeere and
160 in Makueni) in the targeted villages were surveyed in
2003 before the PMGs were established as part of a
research project that aimed to pilot alternative institutional
innovations for improving market access for smallholders.
Farmers were sensitized to form PMGs through voluntary
participation.
 
2
 
 Interested farmers voluntarily joined and
established ten PMGs, mostly based on existing local social
networks of different types. The groups had an agreed
constitution and elected leadership, and were formally
registered as welfare societies (self-help groups) as is
required under Kenyan law. Some of the households that
had initially expressed interest in joining the group sub-
sequently decided not to join. From the initial sample of 400
households, the distribution of members and non-members
was decided later after the PMGs were established on the
basis of committed and paid up members. The average size
of the PMGs in terms of active members varied from 93 in
Makueni to 117 in Mbeere, while the average joining fee
and annual subscription fees were about Ksh 64 and 266
per member, respectively. Information on poverty indicators,
agricultural production, market participation, and adoption
of agricultural technologies was collected from the
respondents during the survey.
During a follow-up survey conducted in 2005 in the
same districts, data were collected at the PMG and at the
farm household level. At the PMG level, all the ten PMGs
were surveyed separately. About five to seven respondents
selected from the PMG management and ordinary
members served as key informants on the PMG marketing
activities, governance, and internal dynamics. All the
participants in these discussions were randomly selected
from the leadership and ordinary members. Data obtained
included objectives and aspirations of the groups, group
characteristics, asset ownership, credit access, grading and
quality control, bulking and marketing, governance, and
major constraints to collective marketing. At the household
level, data were collected from 400 households (210 from
Mbeere and 190 from Makueni districts) in the ten PMG
villages, comprising of 250 members and 150 non-
members. This sub-sample consisted of 150 households
re-sampled from 235 baseline households that had
remained PMG members and 100 households re-sampled
from 165 households that had remained non-PMG mem-
bers. Information obtained included data on socioeconomic
characteristics, assets, credit and savings, production,
buying and selling, and participation in other groups or
social networks and in PMG collective marketing.
The primary data were subjected to qualitative and
quantitative analyses. The PMG data were used to
determine constraints to collective marketing, identify
indicators of collective action and to assess performance of
marketing groups. Household data were used to determine
the marketable surplus and to understand the structure and
performance of rural markets for different crops. This was
used to identify key marketing channels, market actors
along the value chain and their market shares, and grain
prices received by farmers in different markets. In order to
determine whether the resource poor households are
excluded from PMGs, we used a bivariate probit model to
analyze the effect of household assets and wealth indicators
on PMG membership. The bivariate specification was
chosen mainly because many farmers belonged to other
local groups/networks and participation in PMGs and other
groups is likely to be jointly determined. If the error terms
for participation in different groups are correlated, the
PMG membership model would be better identified using
the bivariate probit specification which takes into account
such interdependent choices. This is an extension of
Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model to
binary choice variables (Greene, 1997). We also used a
 
2
 
 The form of assistance provided included mobilizing farmers to discuss
production and marketing strategies for dryland legumes, training in
quality seed production and marketing, and provision of information in
organizing marketing groups. No direct subsidies or incentives were
provided to farmers to join groups. 
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price determination model to identify factors that influence
grain prices in point transactions and to test whether PMGs
pay higher prices to farmers than other buyers after con-
trolling for grain quality, seasonality and distance. We also
tested whether PMG membership facilitated the uptake of
improved varieties. Since group membership is endogenous,
we used the predicted values from the bivariate probit
model to instrument group membership in estimating the
probit model of variety adoption. The descriptive statistics
for selected variables are given in Table 1.
 
4. Results and discussion
 
4.1. Performance of rural grain markets
 
Analysis of the market structure in terms of transactions
(number of sells and volume) by distance and market
participants during 2005 show that rural wholesalers
accounted for 45% of transactions and 49% of the volume
traded while broker-assemblers accounted for 38% of the
transactions and of the traded volume (Table 2).
 
3
 
 This
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of selected variables
Variable Statistic Members
(N = 250)
Non-members
(N = 150)
Total
(N = 400)
Distance to collection centre (km) Mean 1.60 1.80 1.68
Std dev 1.12 1.25 1.18
Dist to nearest main market (km) Mean 6.97 6.95 6.97
Std dev 5.23 6.05 5.54
Family size Mean 7.47 7.01 7.30
Std dev 3.56 3.89 3.69
Sex of head Mean 0.8 0.78 0.80
Std dev 0.4 0.42 0.41
Male workforce (adult worker equivalent) Mean 1.45 1.16 1.34
Std dev 1.1 0.89 1.04
Female workforce (adult worker equivalent) Mean 1.54 1.24 1.43
Std dev 1.01 0.77 0.94
HH owns ICT (tv, radio or telephone) Mean 0.8 0.84 0.82
Std dev 0.4 0.37 0.39
HH owns ox-cart (yes = 1) Mean 0.29 0.23 0.27
Std dev 0.45 0.42 0.44
Ethnic group (Kamba = 1) Mean 0.85 0.89 0.87
Std dev 0.36 0.31 0.34
Household located in an average rainfall area (yes = 1) Mean 0.2 0.2 0.20
Std dev 0.4 0.4 0.40
Household located in a dry rainfall area (yes = 1) Mean 0.32 0.33 0.33
Std dev 0.47 0.47 0.50
Value of crops sold (Ksh) Mean 4,526.8 6,085.13 5,111.18
Std dev 8,716.32 15,664.6 11,815.93
Household food insecurity (yes = 1) Mean 0.79 0.78 0.79
Std dev 0.41 0.42 0.41
Membership in agricultural productive groups (APG) (yes = 1) Mean 0.2 0.11 0.17
Std dev 0.4 0.31 0.37
Adopted improved maize (yes = 1) Mean 0.14 0.1 0.13
Std dev 0.35 0.3 0.33
Adopted improved pigeonpea (yes = 1) Mean 0.4 0.27 0.35
Std dev 0.49 0.45 0.48
Adopted improved greengram (yes = 1) Mean 0.28 0.24 0.27
Std dev 0.45 0.43 0.44
Log of per capita livestock assets Mean 3.35 3.31 3.34
Std dev 0.54 0.54 0.54
Log of per capita physical assets Mean 2.71 2.69 2.70
Std dev 0.6 0.7 0.64
Log of per capita farm size (acres) Mean −0.06 −0.04 −0.05
Std dev 0.39 0.40 0.39
Per capita oxen numbers Mean 0.19 0.21 0.20
Std dev 0.25 0.29 0.27
Per capita family education (yrs) Mean 5.97 5.26 5.71
Std dev 2 2.21 2.10
Main occupation (farming = 1) Mean 0.76 0.69 0.73
Std dev 0.43 0.47 0.45
Have no contact with NGOs (yes = 1) Mean 0.16 0.23 0.19
Std dev 0.37 0.42 0.39
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shows that rural assemblers and wholesalers jointly control
more than 80% of the grain transactions and traded
volumes. These traders are well positioned to buy directly
from dispersed farmers. As in other parts of Africa,
transactions in these areas largely rely on personal visits by
traders (or their agents) to inspect quality and negotiate
prices. The high search and assembly costs that require
extensive travel and presence of the trader at the time of
exchange increase the transaction costs (Fafchamps and
Gabre-Madhin, 2006) and reduce the share of the consumer
price received by the farmer. The nascent PMGs only
accounted for 4% of the sales and 2% of the volume while
other buyers (rural consumers, cotton ginneries, schools,
etc) accounted for about 10–12% of the sales and volume
purchased from sample farmers.
Further, 45% of the traded volume and 36% of the
transactions were conducted right at the farm-gate. About
34% of the transactions (accounting for 25% of the traded
volume), were conducted within 3 km from the farm-gate.
This means that about 70% of the transactions were traded
within 3 km of the farm-gate. The number of transactions
and volumes traded by market participant decline
significantly with distance; less than 8% of the transactions
and 10% of the traded volume were traded in markets more
than 5 km away from the farm. This can be attributed to
increasing transportation and transaction costs for the small
quantities marketed as distances increase, which is con-
sistent with the findings by Fafchamps and Hill (2005). The
prices also varied significantly over time — increasing
gradually as local supplies decline and declining again as
local produce reaches local markets after harvest. This
illustrates potential business opportunities for PMGs
through bulk marketing and spatial and temporal arbitrage.
In order to illustrate the effect of different buyers and
growing conditions on prices received by farmers, traded
volumes, and market shares, we use panel data collected
on pigeonpea marketing (Table 3). While rural assemblers
and wholesalers remain dominant market actors, the
volumes traded significantly decline when erratic rainfall
patterns reduce smallholder production. The drought that
prevailed during the 2004/05 production season signi-
ficantly depressed the marketed surplus and the number of
transactions in 2005. The drought reduced transactions
from 243 in 2003 (normal year) to just 50 during 2005
while volume declined from about 41 tons to 4.7 tons. Such
drastic changes in market supply are indicative of the
challenges that individual farmers and PMGs face in
commercializing production. While drought-induced shocks
that reduce individual marketable surplus create incentives
for collective marketing, the need for achieving economies
 
3
 
 We use the brokers and assemblers jointly as most of the assemblers in
rural areas also function as agents of other larger traders in the supply
chain.
Table 2. Total transactions (number of sales) and volumes (tons) in 2004/05 (all crops)
Table 3. Pigeonpea marketed volumes, transactions and channel utilization by participant and distance to markets
Buyer Total Share (%) Farmgate <3 km 3–5 km >5 km
Sales Volume Sales Volume Sales Volume Sales Volume Sales Volume Sales Volume
Consumer 33 6.5 5 3 21 4.7 6 0.7 3 0.5 3 0.7
PMG 27 3.7 4 2 4 0.8 10 0.7 12 2.2 1 0.1
Rural wholesaler 283 101.8 45 49 25 27.5 167 43.3 82 29.9 9 1.0
Broker-assembler 237 77.7 38 38 175 60.0 24 5.2 16 2.9 22 9.7
Urban wholesaler 13 6.4 2 3 1 0.0 3 0.2 3 0.2 6 6.1
Cotton ginnery 12 4.7 2 2 – – 2 0.4 9 4.1 1 0.2
School 19 4.9 3 2 – – 2 0.7 10 2.1 7 2.0
Total 624 205.7 100 100 226 93.0 214 51.1 135 41.9 49 19.7
Share (%) – – – – 36 45 34 25 22 20 8 10
Buyer Traded volume 
(tons)
Transactions at different points (number) Mean price 
(Ksh/kg)
Farmgate <3 km 3–5 km >5 km
2003 2005 2003 2005 2003 2005 2003 2005 2003 2005 2003 2005
Consumer 2.0 0.36 20 0 2 1 1 2 0 0 22 25
PMG – 0.35 – 1 – 3 – 3 – 0 27
Rural wholesaler 11.9 1.65 9 2 56 12 22 6 6 2 15.3 23
Broker-assembler 24.6 2.06 76 10 14 1 5 1 15 3 18.6 25
Urban grain trader 2.8 0.29 3 0 3 1 0 1 11 1 24.8 24
Total 41.3 4.68 108 13 75 18 28 13 32 6 18.1 25
Share (%) – – 44 26 31 36 12 26 13 12
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of scale requires larger volumes. The results also show that
the average farm-gate prices paid by the PMGs (Ksh 27/kg)
were generally higher than other buyers (Ksh 23–25/kg).
The significance of this will be tested and presented later
using a price regression model.
 
4.2. Participation in collective marketing groups
 
One question that is often raised in relation to farmer
organizations is whether resource poor and smallholder
farmers could actually participate in these organizations
and benefit from collective action. In order to explore this
question, we tested whether the PMGs — voluntarily
formed by farmers — were biased towards the wealthier
households and excluded the resource poor and marginal
farmers. This requires careful analysis of the determinants
of PMG membership, and, in particular, tests of the effect
of household assets and wealth indicators. Since house-
holds often belong to more than one group, we used a
bivariate probit model to identify the determinants of PMG
membership.
 
4
 
 The bivariate specification was particularly
used to test whether PMG membership is jointly determined
with membership to closely related groups — agricultural
production networks (APNs). Membership to APNs thus
constituted the second equation in the bivariate specification.
Model variables included village fixed effects (location,
market access, infrastructure), household asset endow-
ments, household characteristics, human capital, and access
to information (Table 4). Household characteristics were
captured by dependency ratios, age and gender, male and
female household workforce, family education, and main
occupation of the household head. Six variables were
included to capture the effect of wealth and asset endow-
ments: farm size, value of livestock, interaction between
livestock and farm size, value of physical assets, ownership
of means of transport, and oxen numbers (all in per capita
terms). Access to information was captured through owner-
ship of ICT (radio, mobile phones, and TV) and contact
with NGO extension personnel. In the absence of effective
public extension services, NGOs continue to play a vital
role in the economic development process in the semi-arid
areas. In this case, the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) was
instrumental in farmer mobilization and sensitization for
establishing PMGs while ICRISAT was the source of improved
germplasm and crop cultivars. Location effects are captured
through distance to local and main markets and average
rainfall conditions for the PMG villages. For comparison,
we also report the univariate probit model results (Table 4).
The bivariate model results show that the residuals of the
two network membership equations are not independent
(P > 0.034). The ancillary parameter 
 
ρ
 
, which measures the
correlation of the residuals, shows that the two equations
were strongly associated (P 
 
=
 
 0.034), indicating the
superiority of the bivariate probit specification. Therefore,
the discussion hereafter focuses on the bivariate model
results. The variables with significant effects on mem-
bership include female workforce in the household (P 
 
=
 
0.018), ownership of ICT (P 
 
=
 
 0.067), log of per capita
farm size (P 
 
=
 
 0.072), the asset interaction term (log of per
capita farm size*log per capita livestock) (P 
 
=
 
  0.042), stock
of household education (P 
 
=
 
 0.014), household occupation
(P 
 
=
 
 0.078), access to information (P 
 
=
 
 0.095). The distance
and location effects were not significant. Family workforce
generally has a positive effect, but only female workforce
had a significant effect on PMG membership, indicating
that PMGs could potentially enhance participation and
integration of the female workforce into markets. The other
household characteristics were not significant.
The most important variables for the purpose of this
paper are the household assets (wealth indicators). The
results show that membership increases with per capita
livestock wealth but decreases with per capita farmland,
indicating an opposing marginal effect of these assets. This
shows that households with larger farm sizes alone are less
likely to participate in collective marketing, while house-
holds with more livestock have a higher probability of
joining marketing groups. This opposing effect may result
when higher livestock wealth is associated with smaller
cropland, which reduces the marketed surplus and increases
the gains from collective marketing. The results confirm
that it is primarily those farmers with small landholdings
who participate in collective marketing. These are house-
holds who produce small marketable surpluses and thus
face higher per unit transaction costs in marketing their
produce. However, households with more land and
livestock assets together are also more likely to become
members. Farm size and the asset interaction terms had a
similar effect on the likelihood of participation in APNs.
Participation in agricultural networks (mainly through
reciprocity and labour exchanges) generally decreases with
land, draught animal (oxen) assets, indicating that large
farmers are less likely to engage in such exchanges. These
findings are consistent with those of Mude (2006) although
the latter focused on coffee marketing, a high value crop
without alternative home use.
We also find that ownership of communication techno-
logies (radio, TV or telephone) reduces the probability of
participating in collective marketing, perhaps indicating
some degree of substitution in accessing market information.
However, households with limited contact with extension
(proxied through frequency of contact with NGOs) are less
likely to join PMGs, showing the benefits of sensitization
and education, but interestingly participation in indigenous
APNs seems to be higher for households who had less
 
4
 
About 11% of the non-PMG and 20% of the PMG member farmers
belonged to agricultural production networks (APNs). These groups are
involved in agricultural production and some marketing activities,
including sharing of labour and information. The membership of sample
farmers to other local groups included 54% to natural resource
management, 75% to saving groups (Mary-Go-Round) and 50% to other
social networks. 
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contact with NGOs. We also find that education and farm-
orientation increase the likelihood of PMG membership.
Along with better education, NGO sensitization and informa-
tion flow seem to be good instruments for facilitating
participation in group marketing.
 
4.3. The benefits of collective marketing
 
In this section we assess the potential effect of group
membership on prices received by farmers and adoption of
new varieties. It is hypothesized that participation in PMGs
Table 4. Bivariate and univariate probit determinants of PMG membership
Variable Bivariate probit Univariate probit 
PMG APN PMG membership
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Dist to village market (km) −0.083 −0.090 −0.082
(0.061) (0.070) (0.061)
Dist to nearest main market (km) 0.006 −0.023 0.006
(0.014) (0.018) (0.013)
HH age (years) −0.006 0.003 −0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
HH gender (1 = male, 0 = female) 0.182 −0.111 0.179
(0.178) (0.207) (0.179)
Male workforce 0.024 −0.104 0.026
(0.082) (0.091) (0.083)
Female workforce 0.206** 0.056 0.204**
(0.087) (0.103) (0.087)
Dependency ratio 0.029 0.094** 0.028
(0.044) (0.047) (0.044)
HH owns ox-cart (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise) 0.138 0.094 0.131
(0.178) (0.198) (0.177)
HH located in average rainy area (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise) −0.120 0.041 −0.127
(0.200) (0.219) (0.200)
HH located in dry area (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise) −0.155 0.396** −0.158
(0.173) (0.200) (0.173)
Log of per capita livestock asset (Ksh) 0.842 −0.507 0.837
(0.533) (0.647) (0.531)
Log of per capita physical asset (Ksh) 0.916 −0.346 0.911
(0.703) (0.854) (0.699)
Log of per capita farm size (acres) −2.093* −2.408* −2.114*
(1.162) (1.330) (1.169)
Log of per capita livestock* Log per capita farm size 0.766** 0 .866** 0.772**
(0.376) (0.397) (0.381)
Per capita oxen numbers −0.389 −0.922* −0.388
(0.316) (0.506) (0.321)
Per capita family education stock 0.097** 0.069 0.099**
(0.040) (0.045) (0.040)
Main occupation (Farming = 1, 0 = otherwise) 0.301* 0.217 0.299*
(0.171) (0.202) (0.171)
HH owns ICT (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise) −0.347* −0.102 −0.352*
(0.190) (0.224) (0.192)
Average contact with NGOs (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise) −0.179 0.243 −0.176
(0.164) (0.203) (0.164)
No contact with NGO (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise) −0.351* 0.490** −0.354*
(0.210) (0.240) (0.210)
Constant −2.744 −0.989 −2.726
(1.845) (2.236) (1.832)
Athrho 0.229**
(0.108)
Wald χ2[df] [46] 98.20: Prob > χ2 = 0.000 [23] 39.44: P > χ2 = 0.0178
Log pseudo-likelihood −395.854 −243.069
Wald test of ρ = 0 χ2 [1] = 4.501 Prob > χ2 = 0.034
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; [df ] are degrees of freedom. 
* denotes 10% level of significance, ** denotes 5% level of significance, *** denotes 1% level of significance.
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would increase prices received by member farmers and
facilitate access to improved varieties and hence adoption
of new technologies.
 
4.3.1. Producer price benefits
 
A key objective of collective marketing is to reduce
transaction costs and improve farm-gate prices for
producers. In some cases, reducing the volatility of local
markets and reducing the price risks could be an important
benefit to small producers. Testing the latter hypothesis
however requires panel seasonal price data for different
buyers. Since the PMGs were not active in 2003, we could
not assess this effect, but use cross-sectional grain sales
data to test whether PMGs indeed pay a significantly higher
price than other buyers. In order to test this hypothesis we
estimated a regression model to identify the determinants
of actual prices received by farmers. The main model
variables included distance to the selling market, type of
buyer, type of grain traded, season, grain quality and
household characteristics of the farmer.
The estimated model was significant (P < 0.001) and
explained about 61% of the variation (R
 
2
 
 
 
=
 
 0.612). The
results show that grain prices are significantly determined
by the distance to the point of transaction, the type of crop
sold, location (district), buyer type (particularly consumers,
PMGs and schools) and the season the grain is sold. Grain
prices were positively correlated with distance (Table 5).
Specifically, prices seem to increase by about Ksh 0.2/kg
for every 10 km traveled from the farm-gate (P < 0.1).
While producer prices increase as distance increases, the
price change for the range of distances covered in this study
(less than 10 km) does not seem to be attractive for farmers
to travel long distances for grain marketing. The small price
gain is likely to be muted by the associated transportation
costs unless the quantity sold is large enough to exploit
economies of scale. This seems to explain why most
farmers prefer to sell the grain at the farm-gate (Tables 1
and 2). After controlling for the crop type, season, quality
and type of buyer, amount sold does not seem to have a
significant effect on prices received by farmers.
Prices vary significantly across crops (P < 0.01). In
relation to maize (reference crop) the price variation ranges
from Ksh 4/kg for cowpea to about Ksh 15/kg for beans.
Pigeonpea and greengram — two predominant cash crops
in the study districts — sell at Ksh 12 over and above the
maize price while chickpea fetches about Ksh 14/kg more
than maize. An interesting result is that grain quality does
not seem to matter in price determination; the price
Table 5. Determinants of grain prices received by farmers
Variablea Descriptive stat
 (mean)
Estimated
coefficient
Robust
t-statistics
Amount sold (kg) 324.95 −0.001 −0.97
Amount sold squared (1,000 kg) 439 3.34 × 10−8 0.16
Distance to selling point (km) 4.6 0.023 1.97**
Beans dummy 0.06 15.163 14.99***
Pigeonpea dummy 0.08 11.275 12.06***
Chickpea dummy 0.03 13.512 9.31***
Greengram dummy 0.27 12.321 19.45***
Cowpea dummy 0.03 4.061 2.99***
Cotton dummy 0.04 7.760 4.77***
Vegetables dummy 0.04 7.421 5.51***
Quality (1 = if fair average quality) 0.92 0.222 0.26
District (1 = Makueni) 0.16 −2.194 −2.97***
Consumer buyer (= 1) 0.05 6.757 6.02***
PMG buyer (= 1) 0.04 5.950 5.04***
Rural wholesaler buyer (= 1) 0.45 −0.614 −1.20
Urban trader buyer (= 1) 0.02 0.988 0.52
Cotton ginnery buyer (= 1) 0.02 1.017 0.49
School 0.03 3.570 2.66***
Season1 (= 1 if harvest season) 0.71 −1.491 −1.96**
Season2 (= 1 if 2 to 3 months after harvest) 0.19 −1.173 −1.33
Gender (male = 1) 0.84 0.553 0.81
Education (yrs) 6.79 −0.032 −0.49
Own ICT (yes = 1) 0.82 0.056 0.09
Constant – 13.914 9.79***
N 624
F(23,600) 41.09
R2 0.612
Notes: a Reference variables include: crop price = maize; quality = above average; district = Mbeere district; buyer = broker-assembler; season =
4–5 months after harvest. Level of significance as defined in Table 4.
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differential between high quality and fair average quality
(FAQ) grain is insignificant. This is a reflection of the
classic case of asymmetric information (Akerlof, 1970)
where buyers take the quality of a good to be uncertain and
consider trading only in average quality, which may crowd
out suppliers of superior quality. More than 90% of the
grain transactions were declared as FAQ. More work is
currently underway to understand this effect.
When we look at the different marketing channels,
consumers, PMGs and schools respectively paid about Ksh
7, Ksh 6, and about Ksh 4 over and above the prices paid
by broker-assemblers (P < 0.01). This shows that PMGs
can be attractive market outlets for small producers. The
school feeding programs (captured by the school variable)
also seem to provide an alternative market outlet to small-
holders at significantly higher prices (P < 0.01).
About 70% of the grain is sold immediately after
harvest, but farmers selling at this time (Season1) would
lose about Ksh 1.5/kg compared to those who can afford
to delay selling for 4–5 months (reference season) after
harvest (P < 0.051). Farmers can even benefit from higher
prices by delaying sales for 2–3 months after harvest
(Season2) as prices for this period are not significantly
lower than prices 4–5 months after harvest. This however
shows that PMGs could exploit seasonal price differentials
through temporal arbitrage involving bulking and storage.
This supports the current PMG practice of storing grain for
some months in anticipation of better prices.
A simulation analysis using these econometric results
shows that prices paid by the PMGs to the member farmers
— after having covered operational costs — are about 22
to 24% higher than the prices paid by middlemen, the
major competitors in rural areas (Table 6). However, this
gain comes at a cost of delayed payments to grain sellers
(on average for 5 weeks). In contrast, other competing
buyers paid on delivery or shortly thereafter. This explains
why cash-constrained farmers opt to sell through other
channels, even at a risk of lower prices. As we discuss later,
capital constraints and lack of access to credit are major
constraints to PMGs performance. 
Is the observed price differential sufficient to provide
economic incentives for smallholders to join marketing
groups? What is the additional income that farmers gain
from group membership after having paid the associated
fees and indirect costs? A simple cost benefit analyses of
grain marketing using two prices — that offered by broker-
assemblers and PMGs at the farm-gate — can show these
gains. Using the 24% farm-gate price differentials (Table 6)
for selling immediately after harvest, Table 7 presents (first
half) the estimated gains to members by using the PMG
channel as compared to selling to broker-assemblers. The
associated average costs of membership (annualized
joining fee and annual contributions) and the opportunity
cost of capital for delayed payments are included as costs
of collective action. The average income gain is about Ksh
678 per household, but varies across household groups
Table 6. The effect of collective marketing on pigeonpea prices in eastern Kenya
Table 7. Income effects associated with selling through marketing groups
Buyer Season Point of sale Price
(Ksh/kg)
PMG price
advantage (%)
PMG Immediately after harvest Farmgate 29.81 24.00
Broker-assembler 24.04
PMG 5 km 29.93 23.88
Broker-assembler 24.16
PMG 4–5 months after harvest Farmgate 31.16 22.72
Broker-assembler 25.39
PMG 5 km 31.29 22.62
Broker-assembler 25.52
Value of grain sold (Ksh) Income gain from
using marketing groupsb
Lost income by members for not
using marketing groupsb 
Small Medium Large All households Small Medium Large All households
Using PMG price 2,303 5,387 7,418 5,155 14,381 19,284 22,452 18,705
Using broker price 1,872 4,413 5,988 4,188 10,518 14,407 16,743 13,889
Difference  431  974 1,429  967 3,862 4,877 5,708 4,816
Cost of collective actiona  279  290  296  289  314  330  339  328
Net gain or lost income  152  684 1,133  678 3,548 4,547 5,369 4,488
Notes: a The cost of collective action includes the annualized costs of joining fee, annual subscription fee and the opportunity cost of delayed
payments calculated using the annual interest rate of 4.3% on savings for commercial banks in Kenya.
b The farm size classes represent the lower, medium and upper one-third household groups for farmers selling grain using the PMG and non-
PMG channels.
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depending on the amount marketed. While the income gain
per unit sold is constant, farmers with larger marketed
surplus obtain higher benefits. In our case this varied from
Ksh 152 for the bottom one-third to Ksh 1133 for the upper
one-third of the farm size classes.5
These income gains are modest for two reasons: (a) the
average amount marketed was severely reduced because of
the drought that prevailed during the 2004/05 production
season, and (b) some member farmers chose to sell through
non-PMG channels mainly because these buyers paid
promptly to cash-constrained farmers compared to the
PMGs that need about 35 days.
Assuming that the main alternative at the farm-gate is
using the broker-assembler channel, we use the amount
marketed by the members outside the PMG-channel to
estimate the income loss that they sustain by not exploiting
collective marketing. This is shown in the second half of
Table 7. The average income loss to members by selling
through the broker-assembler channel (instead of using the
PMG) is about Ksh 4,488 per year. This is quite significant
and amounts to about 7.4% of the poverty line income and
it increases further with the amount diverted away from the
PMG channel. This shows the potential of group marketing
for poverty reduction and the need to make this channel
attractive to farmers by addressing the underlying factors
that force them to use other outlets.
4.3.2. Improved access to and adoption of new 
technologies
As indicated earlier, one of the key policy relevant
questions is whether PMGs could also facilitate the access
of smallholder farmers to improved seeds and agricultural
inputs. The PMGs in eastern Kenya have been involved in
local production and marketing of improved seeds of
dryland crops. Selected farmer members trained in quality
seed production methods produce identified new varieties
with the support of some NGOs. The groups then distribute
the improved seeds to members at affordable prices, while
in some cases non-members could also buy seeds from the
PMG outlets at relatively higher prices. While the active
role of PMGs may catalyze and accelerate technology
adoption, it is likely that the new varieties would gradually
spread through farmer-to-farmer exchange of information
and new seeds. Informal technology exchange is
particularly important for open-pollinated varieties and for
legumes where out-crossing is very limited and genetic
purity is less likely to be affected for three to five years.
In order to test the initial adoption effect, we used a
probit specification where membership is instrumented
using the bivariate model results. Separate regressions were
run for maize, pigeopnea and greengram for which a
significant share of farmers indicated planting new
varieties (Table 8). Group membership does not have any
observable effect on adoption of improved maize varieties
5 Higher rates of time preference and hence higher opportunity cost of
capital will lower the gains from using the groups. For example, the
income gains to lower and upper farm size groups decrease to Ksh 132
and 1070, respectively, if a higher annual rate of interest (15%) is used
to value the cost of delayed payments (for five weeks).
Table 8. Effect of PMG membership on technology adoption
Variables Pigeonpea Greengram
Coeff Robust
Std error
T-stat Coeff Robust
Std error
T-stat
Predicted membership 5.494 1.46 3.76*** 2.690 1.03 2.61***
Age of head 0.012 0.01 1.83* 0.002 0.01 0.36
Head is male −0.255 0.21 −1.24 0.305 0.25 1.23
Male workforce −0.098 0.09 −1.13 −0.039 0.10 −0.38
Female workforce −0.405 0.14 −2.91*** −0.105 0.12 −0.86
Dependency ratio −0.037 0.05 −0.71 −0.162 0.07 −2.42**
Owns radio, phone or TV 0.303 0.27 1.11 0.553 0.25 2.23**
Owns ox-drawn cart −0.247 0.19 −1.31 0.281 0.21 1.35
Lives in medium rainfall area 0.673 0.21 3.24***
Lives in dry area 0.807 0.17 4.64*** −0.167 0.18 −0.93
Log of per capita land 1.316 1.63 0.81 1.287 1.43 0.90
Log of per capita livestock −0.485 0.20 −2.42** −0.163 0.20 −0.83
Log of per capita physical assets 0.277 0.16 1.68 −0.119 0.17 −0.70
Log per capital land X log per capita livestock −0.482 0.49 −0.99 −0.351 0.44 −0.81
Per capital oxen numbers 0.356 0.49 0.73 1.224 0.40 3.06***
Per capita education −0.081 0.06 −1.39 −0.131 0.06 −2.29**
Farming main occupation (yes = 1) −0.647 0.23 −2.83*** −0.104 0.24 −0.44
Medium contact with NGO 1.295 0.27 4.79*** 0.122 0.33 0.37
No contact with NGO 1.027 0.35 2.91***
Has extension contact −0.048 0.15 −0.33 −0.514 0.16 −3.20***
Predicted error −1.226 1.47 −0.83 0.423 1.58 0.27
Constant −2.687 0.90 −3.00*** −1.001 1.04 −0.96
Note: * denotes 10% level of significance, ** denotes 5% level of significance, *** denotes 1% level of significance.
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(hence results not shown). This may indicate that both
members and non-members have equal levels of access to
maize seed — a focus of public and other extension efforts
in many parts of Kenya. On the other hand, membership
does seem to have a significant positive effect on the uptake
of dryland legume crops (pigeonpea and greengram)
(P < 0.001). These are important cash and food crops for
many smallholders in the drier areas; hence adoption of
improved varieties for both crops is significantly higher in
the drier zones where these crops are more important.
Farmers with higher dependent family members seem to
have lower likelihoods for legume adoption, perhaps because
food security concerns push these households to focus on
staple cereals. Contact with formal extension systems does
not have any effect for adoption of pigeonpea varieties but
seemed to discourage the uptake of greengram. This may
be a reflection of the predominance of formal extension
systems on major staples rather than dryland legumes. On
the other hand, contact with NGOs does seem to promote
adoption of legume varieties, especially pigeonpeas.
4.4. Effectiveness of collective marketing groups
One major difficulty in collective action studies is to
identify metrics for measuring the level of collective action
and lack of evidence on how such group action contributes
to final performance outcomes. Generally there are no
standardized measures or indicators that can be used to
assess the level, viability and effectiveness (performance)
of collective action (e.g., Place et al., 2002). However,
depending on the situation, certain indicators may be
identified as proxies for the differential level of collective
action and the degree of effectiveness of such action in
attaining stated group objectives. We used the PMG survey
data to identify some indicators for the levels of
cooperation and its effectiveness (performance) in attaining
certain marketing outcomes. Accordingly, six indicators of
collective action were identified: the number of elections
since formation, share of members respecting bylaws,
attendance of meetings, annual member contributions to
the group, cash capital and agreed annual subscription fees
(not shown due to space limitations). In order to facilitate
comparison across groups, the indicators were standardized
in per capita or in percentage values. In relation to the
effectiveness of collective marketing the PMGs were
compared on the basis of two outcome indicators: total
assets built over time and total volume of grains traded
(both standardized per member). The PMGs were then
ranked according to their performance on each of the
selected indicators. An aggregate mean rank for all the
indicators of both the level and effectiveness of collective
action is then used to evaluate the overall performance of
PMGs. While the assumption of equal weights for the
selected indicators is unlikely to hold for all groups, it was
quite sufficient to show the relative ordering of PMGs on
a scale of collective action indicators.
The aggregate rankings across the three effectiveness
indicators (i.e., combining assets built over time and crop
sales per capita) show that Kathonzweni (1.3), Kalamba
(3.3) and Makima (3.5) performed much better than others
(Table 9). The mean rankings for the six indicators of the
degree of collective action indicate that these same groups
performed best, namely Kalamba (3.0), Makima (3.2), and
Kathonzweni (4.3). A non-parametric test — Spearman’s
rank correlation — was used to check for consistency on
how the PMGs were ranked on the basis of selected
indicators for level of collective action and its effective-
ness. The average ranks were strongly correlated (r =
0.985) which shows that groups that did well in terms of
the different aspects of collective action were also the
groups that performed better in terms of achieving their
collective marketing objectives. This confirms that higher
effectiveness in group marketing functions is closely
correlated with higher levels of collective action, a result
consistent with field observations on the level of group
action and its effectiveness.
Table 9. Selected indicators of performance of marketing groups
PMG Per capita assets
built over time
(Ksh/member)
Per capita sales
volume (kg/member) 
Per capita total sales
volume (kg/member)
Mean rank for
performance
indicators
Mean rank for
collective action
indicators
2003* 2004 2003–2004
Kathonzweni 6,393 212 30 242 1.3 4.3
Kalamba 3,130 46 8 54 3.3 3.0
Makima  301 – 123 123 3.5 3.2
Kilia  177 34 23 57 5.3 6.8
Kamwiyendeyi  333 192 0 192 5.3 6.3
Wango  63 – 8 8 6.5 4.8
Emali  268 92 0 92 6.7 6.0
Thavu  395 3 0 3 6.7 5.2
KYM  335 10 0 10 6.7 6.5
Nthingini  34 – 7 7 7.5 5.7
Notes: * Missing data indicate that PMGs were established later in 2003 and did not sell during that year.
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4.5. Policy and structural impediments to collective 
marketing
If the farmer marketing groups offer new opportunities to
make markets work for small producers, what are the
external limiting factors for their growth and expansion?
The study attempted to identity the key perceived
constraints to PMG performance. The median rank for the
three most important constraints to collective marketing
was given as: lack of credit (1), price variability (3) and
low volumes (3) (Table 10). Other less important
operational constraints include lack of buyers (4) and low
business skills (6). In order to exploit the full potential of
PMGs, future policies need to address these constraints.
The prominence of lack of credit as a major constraint
is consistent with the pervasive financial market
imperfections in rural areas (e.g., Poulton et al., 1998;
Kelly et al., 2003) and the wide recognition that this service
can play an important role in marketing and enterprise
development (Kirkpatrick and Maimbo, 2002; Bingen et al.,
2003). Credit constraints may be addressed through rural
micro-credit facilities, contract or out-grower schemes and
inventory credit arrangements. While Grameen bank type
micro-finance schemes may be useful, such loans tend to
be small and hence less suitable for grain marketing opera-
tions that require significant capital to attain economies of
scale. This suggests that while access to significant capital
is needed, selective subsidies may also be required to ‘kick-
start’ agricultural markets as they play an important role in
relieving critical seasonal and cash constraints, and
reducing market and input supply uncertainties (Dorward
et al., 2004).
Processors, exporters and supermarkets that need
consistent and timely supply of high quality products may
also provide financial resources and key inputs to farmers,
through contractual or out-grower schemes. The production
loans can then be settled against the value of the grain
supplied. The viability of such an arrangement would how-
ever depend on three factors: i) the extent to which farmers
are able to supply quality produce in the desired quantity
and time, ii) the ability of the groups to coordinate pro-
duction and marketing activities, and iii) the legal and
institutional framework for contract formation and
enforcement. The latter is critical as many contract farming
arrangements suffer from non-binding contracts and lack
of arbitration and enforcement mechanisms. An inventory
credit or warehouse credit system is another option for pro-
viding credit services. However, the success of warehouse
arrangements will depend on the legal status of the groups,
the willingness of the banks to lend against inventories, and
availability of suitable storage facilities in rural areas.
These results suggest that given the low level of market
development and lack of service providers in many semi-
arid rural areas, the PMGs are unlikely to prosper in a
“business as usual” policy environment. There is a need for
supportive policies that spur their growth and gradual
transition to cooperatives and business enterprises. This
would include an enabling legal framework, improved
access to market information, support to enhance business
skills, and access to essential finance and credit facilities.
The current status of farmer marketing groups in Kenya as
self-help groups (SHGs) means that they lack legal status
as business enterprises. This restricts their ability to access
essential credit and finance from financial institutions.
While the Kenya Cooperative Societies amendment bill
(Republic of Kenya, 2004) would appear to provide for a
stronger regulatory framework within which cooperative
societies can operate (Manyara, 2003; Argwings-Kodhek,
2004), it fails to provide sufficient mechanism for nascent
farmer organizations, now registered as welfare groups,
to develop fully and transit into cooperative societies.
The current legal framework may also inhibit further
development and competitiveness of embryonic groups and
fails to provide sufficient mechanisms to facilitate and
support their transition into farmer-owned business
enterprises.6
5. Conclusions
This study has shown that market liberalization and reform
policies of the recent past in sub-Saharan Africa were
necessary but not sufficient conditions to increase access
and market participation of smallholder farmers in areas
where market institutions and infrastructure are under-
developed. The expected positive response by the private
sector in many areas with limited market infrastructure has
Table 10. Rankings of PMG collective marketing constraints 
(1 = most important)a
Constraint Mbeere (n = 5) Makueni (n = 5) Total (n = 10)
Lack of credit 1.4 (1) 1.2 (1) 1.3 (1)
Price variability 4.6 (5) 2.6 (2) 3.6 (3)
Low volumes 4.8 (3) 3.2 (3) 4.0 (3)
Lack of buyers 5.4 (4) 4.0 (4) 4.7 (4)
Low business skills 4.8 (6) 6.0 (6) 5.4 (6)
Low quality 7.2 (7) 6.2 (6) 6.7 (7)
Storage pests 7.6 (8) 7.6 (7) 7.6 (7.5)
Internal conflicts 8.0 (8) 8.2 (8) 8.1 (8)
Poor leadership 7.8 (9) 9.6 (10) 8.7 (9)
Lack of storage 11.3 (12) 8.2 (7) 9.4 (10)
Theft in storage 10.8 (11) 11.2 (12) 11.0 (11)
Notes: a Figures in parentheses are medians.
6 Among other things, the framework requires that societies annually elect
new office bearers and maintain financial statements that meet
international standards. Failure to meet these requirements may lead to
dissolution.
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generally been very poor, leaving a large number of
smallholder farmers under subsistence production and,
therefore, unable to benefit from liberalized markets.
Structural problems of poor infrastructure and lack of
market institutions needed to fill the vacuum left when
governments withdrew from markets in the process of
liberalization contribute to high transaction costs, co-
ordination failure and pervasive market imperfections. This
realization has necessitated the search for new kinds of
institutional arrangements to enhance the uptake of market-
oriented and productivity-enhancing technologies and
foster market participation and commercialization of
smallholder production. One of these institutional
innovations has been the strengthening of producer
organizations and formation of collective marketing groups
like PMGs as instruments to remedy pervasive market
failures in rural economies.
The analysis presented here has shown that while
collective action — embodied in PMGs — is feasible and
useful, external shocks and structural constraints in the
system require farmer organization and coordination
mechanisms at a higher scale to exploit scale economies.
The PMGs were able to pay higher prices to members
and hence improve opportunities for resource-poor farmers
to benefit from markets. The PMGs also seemed to
facilitate access to improved seed and adoption of new
varieties for dryland crops. This is important since these
crops are largely neglected by public extension systems and
access to quality seed of improved varieties is an important
determinant of agricultural commercialization. While
marketing channels in the study areas are characterized by
long and complex marketing chains and high transaction
costs, which considerably lower the farmers’ share of the
consumer price, PMGs improved market opportunities for
small producers by bulking, storage, grading, sorting, and
selling the produce directly to buyers at the upper end of
the value chain. The links to secondary and tertiary markets
were enhanced through better coordination of production
and marketing activities. There was no evidence that the
PMGs benefited only the wealthier and resource-rich
farmers. On the contrary, the incentive for joining
collective marketing groups seems to be higher for those
with less farmland.
Producer marketing groups have the potential to simplify
and shorten the marketing chain by directly connecting
small producers to secondary and tertiary markets; better
coordinate production and marketing activities and
facilitate farmer access to production inputs at fair prices.
The effectiveness of this collective action was reflected in
the larger volumes of grain transacted and capital assets
held by the group. The effectiveness of collective action in
terms of these performance indicators was found to be a
function of the level of collective action in the form of
increased participatory decision making, member con-
tributions to the PMG, and initial start-up capital. Hence,
better performing groups in terms of collective marketing,
showed evidence of high levels of collective action. The
higher the levels of collective action, the more successful
the PMGs were in terms of monetized per capita assets
built over time and also the per capita grain volumes
traded.
However, recurrent droughts in semi-arid areas and low
productivity of soils reduce marketable surplus and
increase vulnerability and attenuate the benefits of collective
action and institutional innovations. The effectiveness of
groups was also hampered by their lack of cash capital to
pay for produce deliveries by farmers, which reduces their
competitiveness with other buyers. The continued existence
of PMGs under such circumstances depends on the ability
to organize farmers at a higher level of coordination, and
their ability to tackle technological and financial problems
that now limit crop yields, volume of trade and access to
marketing services.
The challenge therefore is to sensitize members on the
democratic principles of participatory group governance
through elections, to provide initial start-up capital to kick-
start their operations, and to encourage members to
increase their registration fees for membership to raise the
necessary minimum capital. This calls for interventions
that improve governance and democratization of farmer
organizations; increase the start-up capital base; and
enhance access to market infrastructure (storage, transport,
communication, etc) and agribusiness development
services (market information, credit, business skills). There
is a strong argument for public investment to support
the emergence and establishment of institutional and
organizational structures that facilitate access to and
participation of smallholders in agricultural value chains.
One strategy to enhance access to marketing services
is to explore the use of crop inventory as collateral for
financial credit and to subsequently encourage formal
financial institutions to extend warehouse or inventory
credit services to organized farmer groups. Another option
would be to pay farmers a portion of the grain value
upfront at the time of delivery and defer full payments until
the grain is sold at higher prices. This would allow farmers
to meet immediate cash needs and also benefit from better
prices by exploiting the power of collective marketing.
Strong public sector support is critical in creating a
conducive policy environment for the emergence of farmer
marketing groups and participation of the private sector.
These strategies should be pursued together with alterna-
tive options for smoothing supply through investments in
drought-mitigating and water-harvesting techniques that
would enable farmers in drought-prone areas to manage
production risk more effectively.
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